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       hina ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) on June 7, 1996.1 Although a party to UNCLOS, China fre-
quently violates the Convention. China’s domestic legislation implementing 
UNCLOS is often inconsistent with the Convention and customary interna-
tional law. The United States has challenged these unlawful claims diplomat-
ically and operationally under its Freedom of Navigation Program. 
 
Illegal Straight Baselines. In 1996, China declared two sets of straight 
baselines, one along its mainland coast and the other around the disputed 
Paracel Islands (See the figure below).2 In 2012, China established straight 
baselines around several of the disputed Senkaku Islands.3 The normal base-
line for measuring the breadth of the various maritime zones is the low-water 
line.4 Straight baselines may only be used in limited circumstances.5 Most of 
China’s mainland coast does not meet these special geographic requirements. 
With regard to the Paracels and Senkaku Islands, China effectively drew ar-
chipelagic straight baselines around these disputed features.      
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China, as a continental State, may 
not legally establish archipelagic 
straight baselines around any of its 
claimed island groups.6 These un-
lawful straight baselines allow China 
to claim thousands of square miles 
of territorial seas that should remain 
international waters, and a signifi-
cant amount of internal waters that 
should remain territorial seas. These 
expanded claims encroach on 
neighboring States’ exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) and continental 
shelf claims in the Yellow Sea, East 
China Sea, and South China Seas, 
and impede freedom of navigation 
rights. 
 
Excessive Internal Waters 
Claims. China claims the Gulf of 
Bohai and the Hainan Strait as inter-
nal waters based on historic rights.7 
In order to substantiate an historic 
bay or historic waters claim, interna-
tional law requires that a State must 
demonstrate its open, notorious, ef-
fective, and continuous exercise of 
authority over the bay/waters, cou-
pled with an actual showing of ac-
quiescence (or absence of opposi-
tion) by foreign States in the exercise of that authority.8 The Gulf of Bohai 
has not been listed in standard compilations of historic bays, and both the 
United States and the United Kingdom protested the claim in 1958. There-
fore, the claim does not appear to enjoy sufficient acquiescence by foreign 
governments as required by international law. The Strait of Hainan is listed 
as a major strait in standard collections and qualifies under UNCLOS as a 
strait used for international navigation where the right of transit passage ap-
plies.9 China’s claim that the strait is within its internal waters has also been 
 
 
As stated in the U.S. Oceans Pol-
icy (1983), the United States will 
exercise and assert its rights, free-
doms, and uses of the sea on a 
worldwide basis in a manner con-
sistent with the balance of interests 
reflected in the Law of the Sea 
Convention. Some coastal States 
assert excessive maritime claims – 
that is, claims to maritime zones or 
jurisdiction that are inconsistent 
with the international law of the 
sea and, if left unchallenged, could 
impinge on the rights, freedoms, 
and uses of the sea and airspace 
guaranteed to all States under in-
ternational law. China is one of 
those States. The United States, 
however, will not acquiesce in uni-
lateral acts of other States designed 
to restrict the rights and freedom 
of the international community. 
Therefore, U.S. Indo-Pacific Com-
mand will continue to challenge 
China’s excessive claims until such 
time that China revises its claims 











protested by several States. Therefore, China may not close the Hainan Strait 
to international navigation claiming that it is internal waters. 
 
Illegal Prior Permission Requirement for Innocent Passage. China’s 
territorial sea law requires foreign warships and other government non-com-
mercial vessels to obtain prior permission before engaging in innocent pas-
sage through the territorial sea.10 This requirement does not comport with 
the innocent passage provisions of UNCLOS, which apply to “ships of all 
States.”11 On its face, Article 17 applies to all ships, including military and 
other government vessels. This position is supported by Article 19, which 
contains a list of military activities that are prohibited when ships are engaged 
in innocent passage, such as weapons exercises, intelligence collection and 
launch or recovery aircraft or other military devices. The presumption is that 
warships not engaged in a prohibited activity automatically enjoy the regime 
of innocent passage, as Article 19 would be unnecessary if warships did not 
have a right of innocent passage. Lack of prior notification or consent is not 
one of the prohibited activities listed in Article 19. During the UNCLOS 
negotiations, an effort to include a prior notification/consent requirement 
in Article 21 was not supported by a majority of the delegations.12 At the 
conclusion of the negotiations, the President of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, 
confirmed, “the Convention is quite clear on this point. Warships do, like 
other ships, have a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, and 
there is no need for warships to acquire the prior consent or even notifica-
tion of the coastal State.”13 
 
Unlawful Security Jurisdiction in the Contiguous Zone. China claims a 
12 nm contiguous zone adjacent to its territorial sea.14 Within the zone, 
China claims authority to prevent and punish infringement of its “security, 
customs, fiscal, sanitary laws and regulations or entry-exit control within its 
land territories, internal waters or territorial sea.”15 UNCLOS is very clear on 
this issue—coastal State jurisdiction in the contiguous zone is limited to the 
control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations in its territory or territorial 
sea.16 China’s purported claim to exercise “security” jurisdiction in its con-













Illegal Restrictions on Military Activities in the EEZ. China claimed a 
200 nm EEZ in 1998.17 China purports to regulate foreign military activities 
in the EEZ based on a series of arguments that have evolved over the past 
two decades, from national security and “peaceful purposes,” to regulation 
of marine scientific research (MSR), to arguments based on resource man-
agement and environmental protection.18 More recently, some Chinese 
scholars have taken the unprecedented position that differentiates between 
freedom of navigation for commercial ships and freedom of navigation for 
naval vessels. China argues that naval vessels only enjoy “freedom of navi-
gation” on the high seas. In the EEZ, warships enjoy the more limited right 
of “peaceful navigation.”19 Thus, when operating in the EEZ, China main-
tains that U.S. warships may not engage in military activities and must take 
into consideration China’s security interests. A plain reading of UNCLOS 
and its negotiating history refutes China’s position and confirms long-stand-
ing state practice that all nations have an absolute right under international 
law to conduct military activities that are consistent with Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter beyond the territorial sea of another nation.20 
The EEZ was devised primarily to grant coastal States greater control 
over the living and non-living resources adjacent to their coasts. Apart from 
these limited coastal State resource rights, all States enjoy high seas freedoms 
of navigation and overflight, and other internationally lawful uses of the seas 
related to those freedoms in the EEZ. UNCLOS Articles 55, 56, 58 and 86 
accommodate the various competing interests of coastal and user States in 
the EEZ, maximizing coastal State control over natural resources without 
diminishing freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea. Long-standing State practice confirms that the term “other interna-
tionally lawful uses” does not refer solely to navigation and overflight rights. 
Military operations, exercises, and activities have always been regarded as 
“internationally lawful uses of the sea,” and the right to conduct such activ-
ities is enjoyed by all States in the EEZ without coastal State notice or con-
sent.21 Ambassador Koh confirmed this conclusion at a conference in Sin-
gapore in 2008. The Ambassador recalled that, while some States argued that 
the status of the EEZ should approximate the legal status of the territorial 
seas, most States were of the opinion that coastal State rights in the EEZ 
were limited to the exploitation of resources, and that the water column 
should be treated much like the high seas. He went on to state, “I find a 
tendency on the part of some coastal States . . . to assert their sovereignty in 
the EEZ . . . is not consistent with . . . the correct interpretation of . . . [Part 












Air Defense Identification Zone. In November 2013, China established 
an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea. 
All aircraft entering the zone must file their flight plan and maintain com-
munications with Chinese authorities, operate a radar transponder, and be 
clearly marked with their nationality and registration identification. Aircraft 
that do not cooperate with the identification procedures or follow the in-
structions of the Chinese authorities will be subject to undefined “defensive 
emergency measures.”23 International law does not prohibit nations from es-
tablishing ADIZs in international airspace off their coast. However, the 
manner in which Beijing implements and enforces its ADIZ is problematic. 
The legal basis for establishing an ADIZ in peacetime is that States enjoy 
the right to establish reasonable conditions of entry into their land territory. 
Aircraft approaching national airspace may be required to provide identifi-
cation while in international airspace, but only as a condition of entry ap-
proval. This is analogous to imposition of conditions of port entry for ships 
entering a nation’s ports or traversing its internal waters. China’s ADIZ pro-
cedures, however, apply to all aircraft transiting the zone, regardless of 
whether they intend to enter Chinese national airspace. Beijing’s application 
of its ADIZ regulations to transiting aircraft that do not intend to enter Chi-
nese national airspace is, therefore, inconsistent with international law. Air-
craft of all nations are guaranteed freedom of overflight in international air-
space seaward of the territorial sea.24 China may not, consistent with time-
honored freedoms of navigation and overflight, condition transits through 
international airspace on pre-notification to Chinese authorities. 
 
Nine-Dash Line. China claims “indisputable sovereignty over the islands 
in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil 
thereof” encompassed by the Nine-Dash Line (9DL).25 On June 21, 2013, a 
Tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS to decide an arbi-
tration instituted by the Philippines against China. Over China’s objection, 
the Tribunal found on October 29, 2015, that it had jurisdiction over the 
dispute. On July 12, 2016, the Tribunal issued a unanimous award that is 
final and binding on both parties. 
With regard to China’s claim of historic rights to the resources within 
the 9DL, the Tribunal concluded that any historic rights China may have had 
were extinguished to the extent the claimed rights were incompatible with 











was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over 
the waters or resources within the 9DL and there was no legal basis for China 
to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 
9DL. With regard to the status of the Spratly Islands features, the Tribunal 
determined that none of the Spratly Islands, including the seven features oc-
cupied by China, is capable of generating an EEZ. The Tribunal also found 
that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ by (1) 
interfering with Philippine fishermen and petroleum exploration; (2) con-
structing artificial islands; and (3) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from 
fishing in the zone. The Tribunal additionally concluded that China’s large-
scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the South 
China Sea violated China’s obligation under the Convention to preserve and 
protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endan-
gered species, and that China had failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from 
harvesting endangered species.26 
This landmark decision soundly repudiates China’s excessive claims and 
activities within the South China Sea and deals a death knell to China’s infa-
mous 9DL and its coercive behavior against other South China Sea claim-
ants. Beijing’s refusal to comply with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal 
simply reconfirms China’s disdain for the international rules-based legal or-
der, which has directly contributed to the unprecedented growth and pros-
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